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CIVIL RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
Civil rights law attempts to resolve tension between inconsistent individu-
al and public interests.' This Survey examines how the Tenth Circuit has bal-
anced these important interests in several decisions handed down from Sep-
tember 1994 to September 1995. Part I analyzes three cases involving the
constitutional right to privacy. Two of these cases addressed the privacy right
to avoid state dissemination of personal information.2 For the first time, the
Tenth Circuit found a state action violating this right.3 The other case4 ad-
dressed whether a Utah abortion statute violated the right to be free from
government intrusion into intimate decisionmaking in light of Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey!
Part II focuses on two decisions addressing discrimination under the Fair
Housing Act.6 In these cases, the Tenth Circuit joined other circuits in rec-
ognizing disparate impact as a way to prove housing discrimination.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Background
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly recognize a
right to privacy, its philosophical origins derive from the Bill of Rights.7 Pri-
vacy issues play a pivotal role in such areas as reproductive rights,' freedom
from technological surveillance,9 and freedom of association.' °
Defining constitutional "privacy" is perhaps impossible." In attempts to
capture the essence of the privacy right, scholars have termed it "the right to
1. Robert A. Destro, The Hostages in the 'Hood, 30 ARiz. L. REV. 785, 820 (1994).
2. Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369 (10th Cit. 1995); Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45
F.3d 1383 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995). Although not featured in this article, the
Tenth Circuit also decided F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1534-36 (10th Cir. 1995) (granting
qualified immunity to defendants who allegedly violated the plaintiffs' right to privacy when they
seized the plaintiffs' medical records).
3. Sheets, 45 F.3d at 1383.
4. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Leavitt v. Utah, No.
95-1242, 1996 WL 327446.
5. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6. Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cit. 1995); Mountain Side Mobile Es-
tates Partnership v. Secretary of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cit. 1995).
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). See generally DARIEN A. McWHIRTER & JON
D. BI LE, PRIVACY AS A CoNsTrrtrnoNAL RIGHT 33-88 (1992) (discussing the philosophical,
constitutional, and common law foundations of the right to privacy); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM 330-403 (1967) (discussing the history of privacy in American law).
8. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-70 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
9. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
10. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
11. Phillip Kurland, The Private !, U. CH. MAG., Autumn 1976, at 7, 12.
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be let alone," freedom "from unwanted intrusion," "the sum of all 'private
rights,' '. E "personality," "personhood," "autonomy," and "anonymity." 3 In
short, one cannot find a single operative definition for constitutional privacy.
The concept's meaning clearly changes in different settings.
Scholars credit an 1890 article by Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. War-
ren as the first source entreating courts to recognize a common law right to
privacy in the United States. 4 A response to such intrusive new technologies
as still photography, The Right to Privacy defined legal privacy as "the right
to be let alone."' 5 Although at the time no legal precedent supported the rec-
ognition of privacy as a substantive right, 6 this work spawned a concept that
now pervades American legal theory.
Years later, Justice Brandeis emerged as the first member of the Court to
advocate a constitutional right to privacy. 7 His famous dissent in Olmstead v.
United States" urged the majority to broadly interpret the express liberties of
the Bill of Rights to include an implied right to privacy. 9 He viewed the
"right to be let alone" as a fundamental liberty deserving of constitutional
protection."0 Although this effort proved unsuccessful,2' Brandeis's dissent
in Olmstead laid the analytical foundation for Griswold v. Connecticut,22 in
which the Court finally recognized a general right to privacy.23
Justice Douglas, writing for a plurality in Griswold, explained that a gen-
eral right to privacy can be inferred from the overlapping "zones" or "penum-
bras" emanating from the liberties expressly reserved by the Bill of Rights."'
12. See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1419 (1974).
13. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335, 1337-38.
Still others have attempted to organize privacy rights into taxonomies like "solitude," "intimacy,"
and "reserve," WESTIN, supra note 7, at 31, or "secrecy, anonymity, and solitude." Gormley, su-
pra, at 1338.
14. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890). For more information about the historical antecedents of constitutional privacy, see
MORRIS L. ERNST & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE 1-23 (1962);
MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra note 7, at 61-62; Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 233, 240 n.26 (1977).
15. See ERNST & SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 49.
16. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1979).
17. VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION
23 (1991).
18. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
19. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
20. Id. ("[The framers of the Bill of Rights] conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.").
21. See id. at 455-56, 465 (refusing to expand the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures to include warrantless government surveillance of private tele-
phone conversations).
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
24. Id. at 483-84. These "penumbras" or "zones of privacy" emanated from the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Id. at 484. For a discussion on the historical meaning of
the word "penumbra" and its use by Justice Douglas in Griswold, see Henry T. Greely, A Foot-
note to "Penumbra" in Griswold v. Connecticut, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 251 (1989). Webster's
definitions for "penumbra" include: "a space of partial illumination between the perfect shadow on
all sides and the full light," and "an area containing things of obscure classification: an uncertain
middle ground between fields of thought or activity." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIO-
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Despite division over the source of the new privacy right,' the Court recog-
nized a general right of privacy encompassing freedom from state intrusion
into the marriage relationship and struck down a law forbidding married
couples' use of contraceptives. 6
Today, debate continues regarding the scope of the general right to priva-
cy.21 The prevailing modern view concerning constitutional privacy's source
is that the right to privacy is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28
After Griswold, the Supreme Court recognized two distinct privacy inter-
ests arising out of the general right to privacy: "the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and "the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions."2 9 Lower courts have character-
ized the first of these interests as the "confidentiality" branch of privacy, and
the second as the "autonomy" branch.3" The Tenth Circuit issued several de-
cisions during the survey period that addressed these two privacy rights.
NARY UNABRIDGED 1673 (3d ed. 1981).
25. Justices Harlan and White believed that the statute violated substantive Due Process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500, 502 (Harlan, J., concurring, and
White, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan, wrote a separate concurring opinion emphasizing the Ninth Amendment's guarantee of
fundamental liberties not expressly reserved in the Constitution. Id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring). Justices Black and Stewart dissented. Id. at 507, 527 (Black & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
For a critical analysis of these theories, see Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Re-
view: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REv. 293, 304-12 (1986); Henkin, supra
note 12, at 1416-24.
26. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
27. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 748-49 (1989) (criti-
cizing the Supreme Court's more recent holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
where the Court held that homosexual sodomy fell outside the boundary of private activities pro-
tected from government intrusion).
28. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a right to privacy based on the "Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty"); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598
n.23 (1977) (quoting the Roe Court's determination that the right to privacy stems from the Four-
teenth Amendment). But see Gerety, supra note 14, at 239-40 n.25 (arguing that cases following
Griswold did not settle the "question of constitutional derivation" of the general right to privacy);
Henkin, supra note 12, at 1422 (arguing that subsequent decisions did not revisit the analyses jus-
tifying privacy as a constitutional right but have assumed the existence of such a right).
29. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600. The Whalen Court cited Professor Kurland's article dis-
cussing "three facets" of privacy, one of which is protected directly by the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 599 n.24; see also Gormley, supra note 13, at 1339-40 (organizing legal privacy into five cate-
gories, three of which parallel the constitutional privacy rights set out in Whalen); Rubenfeld,
supra note 27, at 740 (distinguishing between "informational" privacy, or limiting the ability of
others to access to information about the private aspects of one's life, and "substantive" privacy,
or limiting government interference with personal autonomy); cf MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra
note 7, at 104 (identifying "the right to engage in sex and marriage, the right to have an abortion
and the right to be free from searches that invade privacy" as the three major subdivisions of
privacy).
30. See Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 840 (1st Cir. 1987).
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B. Informational Privacy: The Constitutional Right to Confidentiality
1. Supreme Court Decisions
The first category of privacy rights lurking within the "penumbras" of
Fourteenth Amendment privacy involves the individual's interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters. The Supreme Court expressly recognized this
right in Whalen v. Roe.3 The Supreme Court did not, however, recognize a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right on the facts of Whalen, nor has it
done so in any subsequent decision.32
The plaintiffs in Whalen challenged a statute requiring physicians to com-
pile prescription records containing detailed patient information for dangerous
drug prescriptions.33 During a five-year period, a limited number of health
officials could access these records.34 The Court held that the patient-identifi-
cation provisions did not violate the right to privacy.35 Given the limited ac-
cess and statutory safeguards against unwarranted disclosure, the importance of
providing necessary medical information to health care officials outweighed
the minimal risk of erroneous or fraudulent disclosure of personal informa-
tion.36
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,37 the Court recognized the
right to avoid disclosure of personal matters, but as in Whalen, the Court
refused to find a violation of that right on the facts of the case." President
31. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
32. See id. 429 U.S. at 600; Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455-56
(1977). Lower courts commonly cite Whalen and Nixon as the authority for the existence of the
"informational" privacy right. See, e.g., Igneri v. Moore, 898 F.2d 870, 873 (2d Cir. 1990);
Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986).
33. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591-93.
34. Id. at 593-95.
35. Id. at 591.
36. Id. at 600-04. Critics assert that in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695-96 (1976), the Court
rejected a general right to privacy protecting individuals from state dissemination of personal in-
formation by the state. See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981). In Paul, police
officers distributed flyers identifying as an "active shoplifter" a man charged with shoplifting but
later acquitted. The Court refused to recognize the plaintiff's claim that the action infringed on
one of the "zones of privacy" protected by the Bill of Rights. Paul, 424 U.S. at 696. The majority
of courts and commentators, however, feel comfortable in construing Paul and Whalen as consis-
tent. See Bruce W. Clark, Note, The Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 51 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 133, 140 (1982) (offering a limited reading of Paul as merely rejecting an attempt to extend
the autonomy strand of privacy); Bruce E. Falby, Comment, A Constitutional Right to Avoid Dis-
closure of Personal Matter: Perfecting Privacy Analysis in J.P. v. DeSanti, 71 GEO. LJ. 219, 222-
24 (1982) (pointing out that Paul does not explicitly reject a right against disclosure in all cases
but only as against disclosure "of an official act such as an arrest" already appearing on the public
record); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-16, at 1396 (2d
ed. 1988) (interpreting Paul as imposing "federalism-based limits" on § 1983 liability rather than
repudiating "deep substantive principles under the Fourteenth Amendment").
37. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
38. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465. Critics have rejected Nixon as authority for a privacy right to
avoid disclosure of personal matters. See DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1089 n.4 ("[The Court's] analysis
of the privacy issue in Nixon appears to be based on the Fourth Amendment requirement that all
searches and seizures be reasonable, not on the scope of a general constitutional right to priva-
cy."); cf Falby, supra note 36, at 234 n.136, 240-41 n.185 (arguing that the Nixon court seemed
to confuse Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment privacy). Both Whalen and Nixon, however, in-
[Vol. 73:3
CIVIL RIGHTS
Richard Nixon claimed that the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preser-
vation Act, which compelled him to disclose materials compiled during his
official activities as President, violated his right to privacy.39 Recognizing a
"legitimate expectation of privacy"'  in any personal communications, the
Court balanced Nixon's interest in confidentiality against the public's interest
in the majority of the materials, Nixon's status as a public figure, the small
percentage of material not relating to official presidential duties, and the diffi-
culty in separating official from private material without a comprehensive
screening process." Finding that the screening process which the act contem-
plated would cause minimal intrusion into Nixon's private affairs, the Court
found that the act did not violate Nixon's right to privacy."2
The Nixon Court's analysis suggests little about what types of information
fit within the definition of "personal matter." The Court's balancing analysis,
however, suggests an intermediate standard to review the government's justifi-
cation for compelled disclosure.43 This standard falls somewhere between the
strict scrutiny standard applicable in equal protection cases involving funda-
mental rights and suspect classes" and the minimum rationality standard ap-
plicable in many substantive due process claims.45
Although the Supreme Court has not examined the constitutional right to
avoid disclosure of personal matters since Nixon, the Tenth Circuit has decided
a line of cases addressing this "confidentiality" branch of privacy. The next
section introduces the Tenth Circuit's test for analyzing confidentiality cases.
volved a statute compelling disclosure of personal information outside the context of a criminal
investigation. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 462; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 n.32.
39. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 455.
40. The Court referred to the Fourth Amendment privacy test, which analyzes the
individual's "legitimate expectation of privacy." See id. at 458 (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967)). Commentators have suggested that the Court confused Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendment privacy. See Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 844 (1st Cir. 1987); Falby, supra
note 36, at 234. On the other hand, the Court may simply have been suggesting that the Fourth
Amendment test has applicability in the Fourteenth Amendment context. See Borucki, 827 F.2d at
844; see also discussion supra note 36.
41. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465.
42. Id.
43. See Igneri v. Moore, 898 F.2d 870, 873 (2d Cir. 1990); cf. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d
1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The Court did not speak in usual terms of standard of review."). For
one commentator's analysis on what the proper level of scrutiny should be, see Falby, supra note
36, at 242-45.
44. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
45. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (adopting a
rationality standard in economic substantive due process claims, but intimating that a more strin-
gent standard of review might apply to statutes "directed at particular religious or national or
racial minorities"); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (applying minimum rationality to a claim that a law
prohibiting homosexual sodomy violated the due process right to privacy). Prior to Casey, the
Court applied heightened scrutiny when disclosure requirements had a "chilling effect" on
decisionmaking protected under the "autonomy" branch of privacy. Thomburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-72 (1986) (invalidating a statutory pro-
vision that required disclosure of a woman's political affiliation, among other information, before
she could obtain an abortion).
1996]
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2. Prior Tenth Circuit Decisions
In a 1981 opinion, Denver Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. Lichtenstein,'
the Tenth Circuit adopted a three-part test for analyzing claims under Nixon.
In Lichtenstein, a state judge issued a discovery order compelling disclosure of
police department personnel files.47 Under the order, the court would first
review the files in camera to determine whether the criminal defendant ac-
cused of assaulting a police officer was entitled to exculpatory evidence within
the files.' To analyze the claim that disclosure of the personnel records vio-
lated the individual officers' right to privacy, the Tenth Circuit employed a
three-part balancing test: (1) whether "the party asserting the right ha[d] a
legitimate expectation of privacy" in keeping the information confidential; (2)
whether "disclosure serve[d] a compelling state interest"; and (3) whether
"disclosure [was] made in the least intrusive manner."'49 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that even if the officers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
keeping the personnel records confidential, the state had a compelling interest
in ascertaining the truth in a criminal trial and in maintaining the defendant's
right to obtain exculpatory material in his defense." Furthermore, the state
judge had ordered the disclosure of the records in the least intrusive manner




In a subsequent case, Mangels v. Pena,52 the Tenth Circuit analyzed only
the first element of the Lichtenstein test and found in favor of disclosure. The
plaintiffs, city fire department employees, were terminated after a department
investigation for illegal drug use.53 They alleged that a city official's disclo-
sure to the media of the investigative report violated their right to privacy.54
Initially, the court noted that whether information falls within the scope of
constitutional protection "depends, at least in part, upon the intimate or other-
wise personal nature of the material."55 Relying on the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Paul v. Davis,56 the Tenth Circuit held "[vialidly enacted ... laws"
gave the plaintiffs notice that any conduct that violated those laws would not
46. 660 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1981).
47. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 434.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 435. The Lichtenstein court adopted this test from the Colorado Supreme Court in
Martinelli v. District Court, 612 P.2d 1083, 1091 (Colo. 1980), which had in turn adopted the test
from Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d 83, 94-97
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs.,
379 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1980) (refusing to expand privacy rights to informational privacy).
50. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 436.
51. Id.
52. 789 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1986).
53. Mangels, 789 F.2d at 837.
54. Id. Although not at issue in Mangels, when a plaintiff asserts a constitutional claim for
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), a defendant may raise the qualified immunity defense.
See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see
also F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1532 (10th Cir. 1995) (granting defendants qualified immu-
nity when plaintiff claimed privacy violation in agency's action of seizing medical records during
an investigation into alleged Medicare fraud).
55. Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839.
56. 424 U.S. 693 (1976); see discussion supra note 36.
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receive constitutional protection from disclosure.57 Because the report did not
contain any personal information unrelated to the investigation into the
plaintiffs' illegal drug use, the court found that the plaintiffs had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in relation to the investigative files.5
Thus, Mangels suggests one limitation on a plaintiff's ability to satisfy the
first Lichtenstein element. "Public" matters do not merit a "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy." More fundamentally, Mangels redefined the Fourth Amend-
ment concept of the "legitimate expectation of privacy" for Fourteenth
Amendment privacy claims.59 When evaluating Fourth Amendment privacy
claims, courts apply a test with both subjective and objective components.'
In contrast, the Mangels court only asked whether the information in the report
was "intimate and personal" when determining the legitimacy of a privacy
expectation.6
Also apparent in Mangels is that the Tenth Circuit has recognized two
subinterests within the general interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters. Whalen, Nixon, and Lichtenstein involved government actions compelling
an individual to disclose personal information to the government.62 Claims of
a privacy violation in this context usually accompany a request for injunctive
relief.63 Mangels, on the other hand, involved government dissemination of
information previously obtained from the individual. Such cases often arise as
damages claims against a state official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' Cases
discussed in this Survey involve both scenarios.
57. Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839.
58. Id.
59. In Schellenberg, the Florida court interpreted Nixon to adopt the Fourth Amendment
standard in the Fourteenth Amendment context, and, accordingly, the court adopted the two-part
Fourth Amendment test. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 94; see Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458.
60. See Falby, supra note 36, at 240.
61. In several other cases addressing this issue, the Tenth Circuit has consistently held that
"public" matters, such as criminal conduct or a public employee's job performance, are not "inti-
mate and personal" and thus do not merit a "reasonable expectation of privacy." E.g., Flanagan v.
Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1570-71 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that police officers did not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in facts contained within an internal investigation file). The court
has indicated, however, that sexual history, personal photographs, and other highly sensitive mat-
ters do fall within the zone of privacy. See Eastwood v. Department of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627,
631 (10th Cir. 1988) (upholding district court's refusal to grant qualified immunity where officer
asked irrelevant questions concerning victim's sexual history during sexual assault investigation);
Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984) (reversing dismissal of privacy claim
where police officers exhibited previously seized "highly sensitive, personal, and private" photo-
graphs to acquaintances). Neither of these cases, however, involved a decision on the merits of the
claim.
62. Inherent in disclosure to state officials is the risk of dissemination of the same informa-
tion to the public. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600; Falby, supra note 36, at 241.
63. For example, a facial attack on the statute or an action to enjoin a court order would
fall within this category. See, e.g., Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 434.
64. See, e.g., Mangels, 789 F.2d at 836-37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) authorizes damage
claims against officials who violate individuals' constitutional rights. Similar claims can arise
against a federal official. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971);
Western States Cattle Co. v. Edwards, 895 F.2d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1990).
1996]
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3. Tenth Circuit Decisions
The Tenth Circuit decided two cases addressing the constitutional right to
avoid government dissemination of personal matters during the survey period.
For the first time, the Tenth Circuit found a government action violative of
this branch of constitutional privacy.
a. Nilson v. Layton City6"
In Nilson, the Tenth Circuit further described what matters are not "per-
sonal" enough to merit constitutional protection. Following the Mangels de-
cision, the Nilson panel held that the Constitution does not protect against
dissemination of information already considered public. In Nilson, even where
the plaintiff had expunged records of a prior arrest under Utah law, the
expungement did not truly remove the material from the public record for
constitutional purposes.
i. Facts
In 1981, plaintiff Demar Nilson, while employed as a schoolteacher in
Davis County, Utah, pled no contest to sexual abuse charges. 66 In 1984,
Nilson obtained a teaching position with the Jordan School District in Salt
Lake County, Utah.67 He later obtained an expungement order under a Utah
statute to seal records pertaining to his 1981 arrest.' The statute provided:
"Any agency or its employee who receives an expungement order may not
divulge any information in the sealed expunged records."69 The state court
did not file the order with any city of Layton official." In 1991, a Layton po-
lice officer with first-hand knowledge of the 1981 conviction spoke to a local
television station regarding the conviction. The discussion led to a report on
the evening news that "received substantial publicity."7'
Nilson filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the
officer's disclosure of the expunged conviction violated his right to privacy. 2
The district court found that because neither the officer nor any Layton official
knew of the expungement order, and thus had not violated the Utah statute
prohibiting an official from divulging such information, "they could not be
held liable under section 1983." 73
65. 45 F.3d 369 (10th Cir. 1995).
66. Nilson, 45 F.3d at 370.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 370 n.1; see UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-2(5)(a) (1990) (repealed 1994).
70. Nilson, 45 F.3d at 370. Between 1990 and 1991, the Jordan School District received
complaints about Nilson's past conviction and new complaints of sexual abuse by Nilson. Id. at
370-71. After an investigation, Salt Lake County officials filed charges against Nilson for sexual
abuse. Id. at 371. These charges did not result in a conviction but the Jordan School District dis-
charged Nilson in 1992. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).




On appeal, the Tenth Circuit analyzed Nilson's privacy claim under the
Lichtenstein test.74 The court held that Nilson failed to show a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy with regard to the expunged conviction." Citing
Mangels, the court emphasized that information must be highly personal or
intimate and not readily available to the public to warrant a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. 76 The expungement order did not create a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy regarding the arrest and conviction because those events were
recorded in documents not sealed by the expungement order and remembered
by the people present." Thus, the expungement order never "truly removed"
the arrest and conviction from the public record.78
Nilson illustrates a continued adherence to the court's reasoning in
Mangels: to merit protection under substantive due process, information must
relate to intimate and personal matters rather than public matters. After Nilson,
however, a workable definition of "intimate and personal" remained elusive.
Precedent had established only that "highly sensitive" materials might fall
within the scope of a "legitimate expectation of privacy" under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that matters of public record or of public concern did not.79
b. Sheets v. Salt Lake County"
Sheets illustrates more precisely what types of information do create a
"legitimate expectation of privacy" under the Lichtenstein test's first element.
In Sheets, the Tenth Circuit recognized a violation of the right to privacy in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.
i. Facts
After a terrorist bomb killed plaintiff Gary Sheets's wife, police investiga-
tors asked Sheets for his wife's diary, a common practice in a murder investi-
gation." Believing the information in the diary would remain confidential,
Sheets gave it to the police.82 Investigators and detectives assigned to the
bombing case received copies of the diary, including one of the defendants,
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 372. The court emphasized that disclosed information must independently merit
constitutional protection as a "fundamental personal interest[ ] derived from the Constitution." Id.
(quoting Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839). State statutes and regulations are merely factors to consider in
determining the scope of constitutional privacy. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 55, 76.
80. 45 F.3d 1383 (10th Cit. 1995).
81. Sheets, 45 F.3d at 1386.
82. Id. The detective who received the diary did not remember whether he assured the
plaintiff that the information would remain confidential. Id. Another detective on the case, howev-
er, testified that he assured Sheets the diary would remain confidential. Id.
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Mr. George. 3 George took thorough handwritten notes from the contents of
the diary and made photocopies of the diary. 4 After the suspected bomber
was convicted, the department archived the diary and the rest of the investiga-
tive file, which made it available for public inspection. 5 Consistent with an
"unwritten policy" in the Salt Lake County Attorney's office allowing em-
ployees to speak freely with the press after a case was closed, George met
with three authors who were writing books about the bombing incident.'
George allowed one of the authors, Lindsay, to examine his notes, and he re-
sponded to the other authors' questions. 7 Some time later, Lindsay published
a book containing direct quotes from the diary. 8
In 1989, Sheets filed suit against the county and several investigators,
asserting a constitutional invasion of privacy. 9 After the district judge denied
the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of
plaintiff's case, the trial resulted in a jury verdict of $650,000 in favor of
Sheets.'
ii. Decision
Affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit initially noted
that Sheets had presented ample evidence for the jury to find that Sheets gave
the diary to the defendants with the understanding that they would keep the
diary confidential. 9 To meet the first Lichtenstein element, this understanding
must have created a "legitimate expectation that [the diary would] remain
confidential while in the state's possession. ' The court, therefore, directed
its focus to whether the diary displayed the "intimate or otherwise personal na-
ture" required to merit substantive due process protection.93
First, the inquiry should concentrate on the nature of the material dis-
closed, not on the author.94 The fact that Sheets' wife wrote the diary had no
bearing on whether Sheets had a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the
diary's contents.95 Furthermore, the information did not have to be "embar-
rassing to be personal."" The court listed other "personal" types of informa-







89. Id. Sheets later amended the complaint to include a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against George and a Salt Lake County attorney, the only defendants remaining at trial. Id.
90. Id. at 1387.
91. Id. at 1388.
92. Id. at 1387.
93. Id. at 1387-88. The court did not make any reference to the two-part Fourth Amendment
inquiry adopted in Schellenberg. See supra notes 49, 59-60.
94. Sheets, 45 F.3d at 1388.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that patients have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in medical records, but granting defendants qualified immunity
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involve embarrassing information but had nonetheless been afforded constitu-
tional protection.9" The Tenth Circuit concluded that whether the diary was
sufficiently personal to merit protection under the Due Process Clause was a
proper question for the jury."
The court rejected the defendants' contention that the plaintiff had no
reasonable expectation of privacy because he knew that many investigators
would have access to the diary." The court distinguished disclosure for a
limited purpose from public release through publication.'0 ' Addressing the
other Lichtenstein elements, the Tenth Circuit held that the government did not
have a compelling interest in disclosing the contents of the diary."°
In summary, the Tenth Circuit's analysis after Sheets looks first to wheth-
er the information in question is personal or public. If the information is not
public, the court lets the jury decide whether the information is sufficiently
personal to merit protection. If so, the government must show a compelling
interest and use the least intrusive means to compel disclosure or disseminate
the information.
4. Other Circuits
Led by the Third and Fifth Circuits, most other circuits have indicated an
acceptance of the right to privacy in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters.0 3 The Sixth Circuit continues to reject the general right to privacy
against government disclosure of private information,' ° and the First and
D.C. Circuits have questioned the doctrine. 5
To analyze claims involving the right to confidentiality, the Third,'
6
Fifth," Eleventh,' and Second"°  Circuits apply a pure balancing
where agency had seized medical records in an investigation for Medicare fraud).
98. Sheets, 45 F.3d at 1388. To guide its analysis, the court referenced the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts and the common law tort of invasion of privacy. Id. at 1388 n.l. The Restatement
test looks to whether the information "involve[s] a matter of public concern," and whether public
disclosure "could be considered highly offensive to the reasonable person." Id. The court noted,
however, that the Restatement merely provides guidance for the constitutional analysis. Id.
99. Id. at 1388.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1388-89.
103. See James v. City of Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539, 1543 (1lth Cir. 1991); Doe v. Attorney
Gen. of the United States, 941 F.2d 780, 795 (9th Cir. 1991); Western States Cattle Co., 895 F.2d
at 441-43; Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13 (Ist Cir. 1988); Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High Sch.,
830 F.2d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 1987); Taylor v. Best, 746 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 982 (1985); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d
Cit. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalas, 575 F.2d 1119, 1128 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129
(1979).
104. See Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995); Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d
733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981).
105. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(refusing to consider the privacy argument as part of a facial challenge to the National Agency
Questionnaire); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 838-49 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding for the purposes
of qualified immunity that no clearly established right against government disclosure of personal
matters existed as of June 17, 1983).
106. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577, 580.
107. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134.
108. James, 941 F.2d at 1544.
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test.'° This majority approach does not attempt to quantify the
"sensitivity""' of the individual's privacy interest, but simply balances what-
ever personal interests exist against the public or state interests present."' A
second approach, taken by the Eighth Circuit, focuses on whether the
individual's interest is sufficiently "fundamental," and then requires a compel-
ling interest to justify the action.'
3
Other courts have applied similar tests to the two tests above. The Ninth
Circuit has applied the Third Circuit balancing test, "  but has also recog-
nized a shifting standard of review, where "the more sensitive the information,
the stronger the state's interest must be."' ' The Fourth and Seventh Circuits
have refused to acknowledge a constitutionally protected confidentiality inter-
est when the information's subject matter relates to conduct not protected
under the "autonomy" branch of privacy."6
No court has drawn a distinction between cases involving compelled dis-
closure to the government and government dissemination of confidential infor-
mation.'' Those cases in which the individual's interest has prevailed
109. Barry, 712 F.2d at 1559.
110. See Clark, supra note 36, at 134.
111. Rather than look to the nature of the information, most courts seem to apply the "inti-
mate and private" standard. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 93. In practice, this standard's
only requirement is that information be sufficiently confidential so as not to be already known or
knowable to the public. See Clark, supra note 36, at 134; Falby, supra note 36, at 240 (advocating
a requirement that considers if the information would remain confidential but for the government
action).
112. Some of the seven factors considered under the Third Circuit analysis include: the type
of record and information requested, the potential for harm and degree of potential injury in non-
consensual disclosures by the state, the "adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclo-
sure," the degree of need for state or public access, and the extent of any "recognizable public
interest militating toward access." Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578. The Fifth Circuit has not ar-
ticulated a seven element test, but has referred to the factors considered in Nixon and Whalen for
help in balancing individual versus public interests. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134. Similarly, the Sec-
ond Circuit has adopted a balancing test, where the government must show a "substantial" interest
in disclosure. Barry, 712 F.2d at 1559.
113. Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that disclosure must
constitute a "shocking degradation," "egregious humiliation," or constitute a "flagrant breech of a
pledge of confidentiality," to merit protection as a constitutional tort).
114. Doe, 941 F.2d at 795-96. For a discussion of the elements of the Third Circuit's balanc-
ing test, see supra note 112.
115. The Ninth Circuit has not adopted a clear standard by which to evaluate the "sensitivity"
of information. See Doe, 941 F.2d at 795-97 (analyzing defendant's qualified immunity defense
and deciding that it was reasonable for him to assume that disclosing information about the
plaintiff's AIDS infection did not violate plaintiff's due process right); Thorne v. City of El
Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 471 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that questions into plaintiffs sexual history
had no relevance to any legitimate interest of defendant police officers in conducting their investi-
gation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984).
116. See Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that facts
about homosexual relations are not the type of information that an applicant had a right to keep
private in light of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Hedge v. County of Tippecanoe,
890 F.2d 4, 7-8 (7th Cir. 1989) (granting qualified immunity to defendants where plaintiff alleged
violation of privacy when asked "sexually related" questions, since the interrogation occurred
while the Supreme Court was still contemplating Bowers).
117. Concerns about federalism, however, seem to affect outcomes. See Clark, supra note 36;
see also J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1091 (6th Cir. 1981) ("As with the disclosure in Paul v.
Davis, protection of appellants' privacy rights here must be left to the states or the legislative
process."). Compare Alexander v. Peffer, 992 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993) (refusing to recog-
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involved either a government official's wanton dissemination of personal in-
formation"' or a mandatory disclosure of private information in exchange
for some public benefit.'
5. Analysis
The disparity between the Third and Eighth Circuit's approaches reflects a
fundamental disagreement about the source and scope of any constitutional
privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.' Nevertheless,
both approaches recognize the need for protecting the individual's right to
confidentiality in some circumstances, but also give credence to the public
interest in limited disclosure when safeguards are present. The first approach
accomplishes this goal by imposing affirmative requirements that a state must
meet to justify disclosure. The second approach does it by imposing a high
threshold for an individual to establish a constitutional right balanced by an
equally high threshold for the government to compel disclosure.
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit's analysis weighs heavily in favor of the
individual's interest. Although the Lichtenstein test purports to adopt the
Fourth Amendment "legitimate expectation of privacy" standard, subsequent
decisions have demonstrated that the Tenth Circuit follows the less exacting
"intimate and private" approach when evaluating the extent of the individual's
interest.' 2' To compensate for the lack of a bright-line standard in
nize a constitutional right to privacy protecting against state dissemination of personal information
unless the information disclosed is a "shocking degredation," "egregious humiliation" or the dis-
semination involves a flagrant breach of a pledge of confidentiality) with Western States Cattle
Co., 895 F.2d 438 (recognizing right to nondisclosure of personal information under Fifth Amen-
dment Due Process in a Bivens action, and applying the Fifth Circuit Plante analysis before find-
ing that no violation occurred).
118. See James, 941 F.2d at 1543-44 (deciding that defendants were not entitled to qualified
immunity where the police exhibited personal video footage obtained in a criminal investigation);
Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir. 1981). But see Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895
F.2d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding no violation where safety mechanisms in polygraph proce-
dure reduced the risk of unwarranted disclosure).
119. See Thorne, 726 F.2d at 468-72. But see Hedge, 890 F.2d at 7-8 (granting qualified
immunity to defendants where plaintiff alleged violation of privacy when asked "sexually related"
questions). In both of these situations, however, the defendant avoids liability by attempting to
limit the dissemination to a specific and legitimate government purpose. See, e.g., Hester v. City
of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11 th Cir. 1985) (control questions used during polygraph
examinations were general in nature, asked for the specific and legitimate purpose of maintaining
the reliability of the test, and left out the most personal of questions relating to marriage, family,
and sexual relations).
120. Critics of the balancing approach have difficulty recognizing a "fundamental" right in
avoiding disclosure of all "personal" information without regard to content. DeSanti, 653 F.2d at
1090 (discussing the requirement in Paul and Roe that a private interest must be "fundamental" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" to merit protection under substantive due process).
These critics interpret the term "fundamental" as requiring that information be extremely sensitive
or involve conduct protected under the autonomy branch of privacy. Clark, supra note 36, at 139.
Critics of the autonomy-based approach are troubled by the prospect of heightened scrutiny. See
Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134 (adopting a balancing standard in light of the Supreme Court's warning
against establishing new "fundamental" interests) (referring to San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973)).
121. Several commentators have suggested an inquiry similar to the Fourth Amendment's
"legitimate expectation of privacy" test as the appropriate standard to determine when information
is constitutionally protected. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967). The Fourth
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determining the types of information to be protected, the Third Circuit's bal-
ancing test weighs the individual's interest against the government's interest,
the existence of safeguards against unnecessary disclosure, and other fac-
tors.'22 Employing a hybrid of the balancing and autonomy-based ap-
proaches, the Tenth Circuit lets the jury decide what interests are intimate and
private (without a clear standard as guidance) and then requires what appears
to be strict scrutiny to justify the public's interest. As a result, the scenarios in
Mangels and Nilson present the only means by which the state can gain access
to private records under any circumstances. Nilson, however, only removes
publicly accessible matters from the scope of protected information," 3 while
Mangels only removes matters of public concern.
Despite these analytical problems, several factors indicate that Sheets,
Nilson, Mangels, and Lichtenstein would have been decided the same way
under the pure balancing test used by the majority of circuits. First, circuits
adopting the majority approach have also recognized the threshold requirement
in Mangels and Nilson that information be private, not public, to merit con-
stitutional protection.'24 Second, the defendant in Sheets could not have justi-
fied his disclosure to the media even if the court had applied intermediate
review since the facts indicate that he disclosed the diary for personal gain,
not for any state purpose. Finally, the defendants' victory in Lichtenstein sug-
gests that the Tenth Circuit did not apply the level of strict scrutiny applicable
in equal protection cases. 25
C. Reproductive Privacy
A woman's right to choose abortion falls within the "autonomy" strand of
due process privacy interests identified in Whalen, the "interest in indepen-
dence in making certain kinds of important decisions. ' The landmark abor-
tion case of Roe v. Wade'27 continues to spark heated controversy in the area
Amendment test looks to the individual's subjective intent to keep the information confidential
and the objective reasonableness of that expectation. See Lawrence J. Leigh, Informational Priva-
cy: Constitutional Challenges to the Collection and Dissemination of Personal Information by
Government Agencies, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 229, 251 (1976); see also Falby, supra note 36,
at 240 (advocating a three-pronged analysis with both subjective and objective components).
122. See supra note 112.
123. For an example of ordinarily personal information potentially available to the state under
Nilson's public accessibility exception, see Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, 765 F.2d 490, 492-
93 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1062 (1986), where the plaintiff's driver's license and
evidence she attended church regularly precluded any assertion that information concerning her
gender or religious beliefs was confidential and protected.
124. See, e.g., id.
125. Gerald Gunther has referred to strict scrutiny in the equal protection context as "'strict'
in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term--Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection?, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). Moreover, an earlier Tenth Circuit case directed the district court to
apply a balancing standard, rather than a compelling interest standard, to evaluate a due process
right to confidentiality claim. See Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984)
(directing the district court on remand to determine whether plaintiff's "privacy interest ou-
tweighed the public need for ... disclosure").
126. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600; supra note 29 and accompanying text.
127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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of reproductive freedom.2 Despite its erosion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,29 Roe remains authoritative in the area of reproductive privacy. 30
In Roe, the Court recognized a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause protecting a woman's right to decide "whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.""'' The Court upheld this privacy right in the
absence of a compelling government interest.'32 Because an unborn fetus was
not held to be a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the state interest in protecting the health and safety of a fetus was not "com-
pelling" enough to override the woman's right to privacy. 3 Legally, the fe-
tus represented only the potentiality of life.'34 Once the fetus reached viabil-
ity, however, the government's interests in protecting the potential human life
and the mother's health became "compelling."'
' 35
To effectuate its holding, the Court set forth a trimester framework to
analyze a state government's power to regulate abortions.'36 During the first
trimester, the state could not regulate abortions.' Because the risk that abor-
tion posed to the health of the woman increased throughout the pregnancy, the
Court reasoned that after the first trimester, the state had a "compelling" inter-
est in protecting the life and health of the mother.3 Thus, after the first tri-
mester, the state could regulate abortions "to the extent that the regulation
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health."'1
39
Because the state had a compelling interest in preserving potential life at via-
bility, the Court held that the state may regulate abortions to protect the fetus
after viability.3" A regulation could even prohibit abortions after viability,
"except when ... necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."''
After Roe, issues arose regarding the extent to which a state could regu-
late abortions after viability. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists,4" the Supreme Court struck down a statute requiring
an abortion method that would give the child the best chance for survival
128. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709, 842 (1995).
129. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
130. Casey, 505 U.S. at 868-70 ("We conclude that the basic decision in Roe was based on a
constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate."). But see C. Elaine Howard, The Roe'd to
Confuision: Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1457, 1475-76 (1993) ("[The
[Casey] Court defined the essential holding [of Roe] so narrowly that almost nothing fits inside.").
131. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
132. Id. at 155.
133. Id. at 162.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 162-63.
136. Id. at 163.
137. Id. When the Court decided Roe, current medical data showed that it was possible for the
mortality rate of women during childbirth to exceed the mortality rate of women having first tri-
mester abortions. Id.
138. Id. at 150, 163.
139. Id. at 163.
140. Id. at 163-64. The point of viability at the time of Roe was thought to be between 24-28
weeks, approximately the end of the second trimester. Id. at 160.
141. Id. at 163-64.
142. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
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unless that method "would present a significantly greater medical risk to the
life or health of the pregnant woman" than another form of abortion.'4 3 The
Court found that this provision established a "trade-off' between the health of
the woman and the survival of the child.'" Instead, the right to privacy rec-
ognized in Roe required that "maternal health be the physician's paramount
consideration.' 45
In the early 1990s, responding to a perceived shift in the Court
disfavoring the privacy right recognized in Roe," several states passed abor-
tion statutes designed to limit a woman's right to privacy in electing abor-
tion.47 This burst of legislative activity culminated with the Supreme Court
addressing the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's abortion statute in Casey.
The Casey Court redefined the standard of review for state restrictions on
abortion. Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality, underscored that "Roe was
a reasoned statement, elaborated with great care."'" The opinion reaffirmed
Roe's "central holding that viability marks the earliest point at which the
State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative
ban on nontherapeutic abortions."' 49 The Court also "reaffirm[ed] Roe's
holding that 'subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother."" 5 The Court was troubled,
however, by later cases' that upheld Roe's requirement that government
regulations affecting abortion must always survive strict scrutiny.'
In light of this concern, the Casey Court modified Roe's strict scrutiny
standard and abandoned the trimester system. Instead, to justify a pre-viability
regulation, a state must show that the regulation would not "impose[] an undue
burden" on a woman's right to choose an abortion. 3 Before viability, the
143. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768.
144. Id. at 768-69.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Jan Gehorsam, In the Hands of Women, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 7, 1992,
at DI (discussing abortion groups organizing in fear that the Court was about to overrule or se-
verely limit Roe v. Wade in light of the Court's decision in Webster in 1989 and the appointment
of Clarence Thomas to the Court).
147. See Steve McGonigle, Near-ban on Abortion Is Rejected, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar.
9, 1993, at IA; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 491 (1989) ("Roe
implies no limitation on a State's authority to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion."). This statement in Webster sparked the movement to pass new abortion statutes in the
1990s. Karen S. Conway & Michael R. Butler, State Abortion Legislation as a Public Good,
ECON. INQUIRY, Oct. 1, 1992, at 609 (predicting the political stance of each state should the Court
overturn Roe).
148. Casey, 505 U.S. at 868-69.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 877-78 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65).
151. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427 n.10 (1983) (hold-
ing unconstitutional statutory provisions requiring, among other things, parental and informed con-
sent), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
152. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870-72. Justice O'Connor reasoned that Roe's trimester framework
misconceived the nature of the woman's interests and unnecessarily limited important state inter-
ests in preserving potential life and protecting maternal health. Id. at 872-74.
153. Id. at 874-75. The Court defined an undue burden as a state action having the "purpose
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state was still precluded from promulgating regulations prohibiting a woman
from making the ultimate decision of whether to terminate the pregnancy." 4
An informed consent requirement and a twenty-four hour waiting period provi-
sion, both aimed at ensuring an informed decision, did not impose such a
burden because they did not unduly interfere with a woman's ultimate deci-
sion. "'55 On the other hand, a provision requiring spousal notification prior to
abortion did impose an undue burden. Factual findings of spousal abuse con-
vinced the Court that mandatory spousal notification would foreclose "a signif-
icant number of women" from making the ultimate decision to have an abor-
tion. 6
In the aftermath of Casey, lower courts questioned how the undue burden
standard relates to facial attacks on statutes. In United States v. Salerno,'57
the Court had held that a facial challenge must be rejected unless there exists
no set of circumstances in which the statute can be constitutionally ap-
plied. ' The Casey court, however, invalidated the spousal notification pro-
vision even though the provision did not impose an undue burden on women
who would have informed their husbands anyway.'59 Despite Justice Scalia's
indication that he would apply the Salerno rule to the abortion context,' 6
Justices O'Connor and Souter have argued that Casey abandoned the Salerno
rule in considering the facial validity of abortion statutes. 161 The next section
discusses circuit court decisions addressing abortion restrictions after Casey
and their application of the undue burden standard.
1. Other Circuits
In Sojourner T v. Edwards,162 the Fifth Circuit addressed a Louisiana
abortion statute criminalizing abortions except in instances of rape, incest, or
to preserve the life or health of the unborn child or mother. 63 The Fifth
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonvia-
ble fetus." Id. See generally Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue
Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 878-92 (1994) (attempting to
clarify the proper analysis under the undue burden standard and arguing that the standard looks to
both the legislative purpose and to the effect on the individual's right to choose abortion).
154. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874-75.
155. Id.
156. Id at 889-95.
157. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
158. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
159. Casey, 505 U.S. at 892-97 ("The proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is the group
for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.").
160. Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that restricting facial challenges to statutes allows states to refine the legis-
lative process).
161. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). For a discussion of the expansion of the overbreadth doctrine and facial challenge issues,
see generally Michael C. Doff, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235 (1994). This example simply demonstrates the circuits' varied application of Casey.
162. 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993).
163. Sojourner T, 974 F.2d at 29. Although the Fifth Circuit found it "usually true that if a
case can be decided either on statutory or constitutional law, [the court] should address the stat-
utory issue first," the court decided that in light of the "clear holding of Casey," and the fact that
the plaintiffs brought a facial challenge to the statute's constitutionality, the court could address
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Circuit held that the statute, on its face, imposed an undue burden on a woma-
n's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. 6'
In contrast, in a separate case, the Fifth Circuit upheld the facial constitu-
tionality of a Mississippi abortion law requiring parental consent before minors
could obtain abortions.'65 Because the minor could bypass the requirement
through a confidential judicial-bypass procedure, the court held that the provi-
sion did not, on its face, place an "undue burden" on the minor's privacy
interest." The Eighth Circuit similarly upheld as facially constitutional the
informed consent provision of a North Dakota statute. 67 The court held that
the statute was virtually identical to the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey
and did not impose an "undue burden" on the woman's right to privacy."6
2. Jane L. v. Bangerter69
a. Facts
In Jane L., the Tenth Circuit addressed a facial attack on a Utah statute
that severely limited access to abortions except in five specific circumstanc-
es. 70 The plaintiffs filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of the
Utah statute in 1991. 7 ' The Supreme Court's decision in Casey the follow-
ing year declared the statute's restrictions on abortions before twenty weeks
gestation' and its spousal notification provision'
73 unconstitutional. 171
Ruling on the remaining provisions in light of Casey, the district court
upheld a choice of method provision,' a serious medical emergency excep-
tion, 76 and severe limitations on post-twenty-week abortions." 7 Sections
307 and 308 of the statute related to choice of method7 7 and required that
the constitutional issues first. Id. at 30.
164. Id. at 31.
165. Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1338-39 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 468
(1993).
166. Id. at 1341.
167. Fargo Women's Health Org., 18 F.3d at 532-33.
168. Id.
169. 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Leavitt v. Utah, No. 95-1242, 1996 WL
327446 (U.S. June 17, 1996).
170. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1495.
171. Id.
172. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(3) (1995).
173. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1995) (requiring a married woman to notify her hus-
band of an abortion).
174. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1496; see Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 873-77 (D. Utah
1992), affid in part, rev'd in part, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995).
175. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-307, 308 (1995). These provisions provide that the medical
procedure used must give the unborn child the best chance of survival. Id.
176. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-315 (1995) (exempting a woman from certain restrictions in
the case of a serious medical emergency).
177. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1496; see Jane L., 809 F. Supp. at 873-74. Section 76-7-302(3)
states, "After 20 weeks gestational age, measured from the date of conception, an abortion may be
performed only for those purposes and circumstances described in subsections (2)(a), (2)(d), and
(2)(e)." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-7-302(3). These circumstances occurred when the procedure was
"necessary to save the pregnant woman's life," "prevent grave damage to the woman's medical
health," or prevent "the birth of a child that would be born with grave defects." UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-302(2)(a)-(e).
178. The discussion of the Jane L. case in this Survey will focus only on those claims impli-
[Vol. 73:3
CIVIL RIGHTS
when a post-twenty-week abortion was allowed, the method of abortion should
be the one which "would best assure the unborn child's chances of survival
unless such a method would gravely damage a woman's medical health."'
79
The district court determined that sections 307 and 308 "bore 'a rational rela-
tionship to the legitimate state interest in the preservation of viable fetal life"'
and held the provisions facially valid.'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first addressed section 302(3) of the Utah statute that
prohibits post-twenty-week abortions except to protect the mother's life, pre-
vents "grave" damage to her health, or prevents the birth of a child with grave
defects. 8 The court did not address the claim that section 302(3) facially
violated the right to privacy by imposing an "undue burden" on pre-viability
abortions. Instead, the Tenth Circuit held the provision invalid because the
section was not severable from section 302(2).8 In spite of the Utah
Legislature's express intent to make the statute severable, 8 3 the court rea-
soned that ambiguities in the legislative intent made it impossible to determine
whether the Utah legislature would have passed section 302(3) without passing
section 302(2).84
The sole privacy issue that the Tenth Circuit addressed was whether a
choice of method provision violated the constitutional right to privacy as rede-
fined in Casey. The court concluded that the Utah choice of method provision,
on its face, violated the right to privacy.' Although Casey modified Roe's
strict scrutiny standard of review, Casey reaffirmed Roe's holding that a state
may regulate post-viability abortion "except where it is necessary, in appropri-
ate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life and health of the moth-
er. 8 6 Therefore, Thornburgh still had precedential value in analyzing
whether a "choice of method" provision regulating post-viability abortions
violates the constitutional right to privacy.'87
cating the right to privacy. While plaintiffs asserted that a ban on "experimentation" of "[l]ive
unborn children" violated their constitutionally protected right to privacy, the court resolved that
issue by declaring the provision was unconstitutionally vague. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1500-02.
179. Id. at 1502; see UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-307, 308.
180. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1503.
181. See supra note 177.
182. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1499.
183. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-317 (1995).
184. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1499. This Survey addresses the severability issue only to point out
that the Tenth Circuit avoided the underlying constitutional issue in adjudicating § 302(3). The
Supreme Court recently reversed, holding the provisions severable under Utah law. Leavin, 1996
WL 327446, at *4. The Court then remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit for further proceedings
in light of this determination. Id.
185. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1505.
186. Id. at 1504 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. 877-79).
187. Id. To strengthen this holding, the court identified "the importance of maternal
health ... [as the] thread that runs from Roe to Thornburgh and then to Casey." Id. Whatever
Casey did to weaken Roe and Thornburgh, it only reaffirmed the idea that maternal health takes
precedence over fetal survival. Id.
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Thornburgh "emphasized that the woman's health must be the physician's
'paramount consideration."'"" The court concluded that the Utah statute's
"grave damage to [the woman's] medical health" standard was even more
oppressive than the "significantly greater" risk standard in the Pennsylvania
statute in Casey."8 9 Thus the court found the Utah statute unconstitutional
under Thornburgh."9
3. Analysis
a. The Post-Twenty-Week Abortion Ban
The district court held that the pre-twenty-week abortion ban imposed an
"undue burden" on pre-viability abortions but upheld the post-twenty-week ban
against a facial attack.'' Had the Tenth Circuit found the provisions sever-
able, the court would have had to address the constitutionality of the post-
twenty-week ban.'92
The Utah statute's twenty-week demarcation between viability and non-
viability imposes the same type of "rigid construct" as the trimester system in
Roe.9 3 When section 302(3) takes effect at the beginning of the twenty-first
week, most fetuses have not reached viability.'94 Thus, the section prohibits
some pre-viability abortions. Casey held that prohibiting abortion before via-
bility constitutes an undue burden.'95
188. Id. (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768-69).
189. Id. at 1503-04. The court found persuasive testimony by expert witnesses defining
"grave" as the "[l]oss of structure or function, shortening of life, irremedial pain and suffering....
[s]erious, complex, [and] threatening." Id. at 1503.
190. The defendants also contended that the "grave damage" standard was the same as the
"grave damage" standard a woman must meet to have a post-viability abortion in the first place.
Id. However, since the court had already reversed the district court and concluded that the post-
viability restriction was not severable from the pre-viability provisions and was thus invalid, the
defendant's argument lacked force. Id. at 1504-05.
191. Jane L., 809 F. Supp. at 871-72 (upholding the provision based on a facial challenge
analysis under Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745). The district court refused to consider the possibility of a
non-viable fetus more than 21 weeks after conception. Id. However, the district court noted that
the majority in Casey had abandoned traditional facial challenge analysis in favor of an undue
burden standard combined with a facial challenge analysis. Id. at 872 n.10. Thus, at the very least,
the constitutionality of this provision is questionable.
192. The Tenth Circuit's analysis under Utah severability law is extremely tenuous. See supra
note 184. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-07 (1980), established a prudential limitation re-
quiring a federal court to avoid constitutional issues when alternative grounds are available. But
see Sojourner T, 974 F.2d at 30 (finding facts and procedural posture of facial attack on a similar
statute warranted dispensing with the Harris requirement).
193. Casey, 505 U.S. 870-72. Justice O'Connor's opinion repeatedly denounced the trimester
framework as being inconsistent with the "essential holding" in Roe, that a woman has a right to
terminate her pregnancy before viability. Id. at 833-34. O'Connor found that although Roe had
been a "reasoned statement, elaborated with great care," its arbitrary act of "judicial line drawing"
demanded reconsideration. Id. at 870. But see supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
194. See John M. Swomley, Abortion and Public Policy, ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 409, 410
(1993) (identifying lung development as the most significant factor preventing medical technology
from reaching a viability point of less than about 24 weeks).
195. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-901; see Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden
Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2025, 2050-51,
2089 n.137 (1994) (arguing for a per se rule against facially undue burdens, and noting that the




The Tenth Circuit's finding that sections 302(2) and 302(3) were not
severable allowed the court to avoid addressing the constitutional issues impli-
cated in section 302(3). The Supreme Court's recent reversal on the severabil-
ity issue will force a determination of the constitutional issues on remand.
b. The Choice of Method Provision
Based on the court's rejection of strict scrutiny in Casey, the district court
upheld the choice of method provision as rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose on the belief that Casey meant the Court no longer considered
the woman's interest fundamental.'96 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit continued
to hold maternal health paramount over any state interest in potential life." 7
The Tenth Circuit's analysis reflects an understanding that Casey did not de-
value or recharacterize the fundamental nature of the woman's privacy inter-
est. It simply reminded courts that states also have legitimate interests related
to abortion which courts should protect when they do not burden the woman's
right to choose abortion.
D. Conclusion
In deciding Sheets and Nilson, the Tenth Circuit better defined the bound-
aries of the confidentiality branch of privacy under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Lichtenstein test remains problematic after Sheets and Nilson be-
cause it fails to adequately consider legitimate state interests. This problem oc-
curs even when disclosure would cause little or no harm to the individual.
Although the test as applied in prior cases produced results similar to the
majority balancing approach, the Tenth Circuit's test may produce inconsistent
results in future cases.
Conversely, in Jane L., the Tenth Circuit heeded the Supreme Court's
directive to more thoughtfully consider both the individual's interest and legiti-
mate state interests. Perhaps, however, the court avoided an easily addressable
constitutional issue. Only when courts test the undue burden doctrine will its
true effectiveness as a balance between state and individual interests be re-
vealed.
II. THE FAIR HOUSING AcT
A. Background
1. General Background
Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act ("FHA," "the Act," or "Title
VIII") in 1968.98 The declaration of policy in the statute states, "It is the
policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
196. Jane L., 809 F. Supp. at 875-76 n.25.
197. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1504.
198. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1994))
[hereinafter FHAI.
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housing throughout the United States.""' This statement, coupled with com-
ments made during floor debate on the original act,2" clearly indicate that
Congress intended a broad interpretation of the Act's provisions. Originally,
the FHA prohibited discrimination in the rental and sale of any "dwelling"20 '
on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. °2 In 1974, Congress
amended the Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender."3 In
1988, Congress drafted the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). °4 The
FHAA prohibited discrimination based on familial status or handicap in the
sale or rental of housing or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of such sale
or rental.2 5 The cases in Part II focus on two of the protected classes, fa-
milial status2" and handicapped persons.2 7
199. Id. § 801.
200. For Senator Mondale's comments during the Senate floor debate, see infra note 243.
201. Congress defined the term "dwelling" as "any building, structure, or portion thereof
which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more fami-
lies, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon
of any such building, structure, or portion thereof." FHA § 802(b).
202. Id. § 804.
203. Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b)(1), 88 Stat. 729 (1974).
204. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619, 1620 (1988).
205. Id. § 6 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (1994)).
206. The FHAA defines "familial status" as
one or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18 years) being domiciled
with-(1) a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual or individ-
uals; or (2) the designee of such parent or other person having such custody, with the
written permission of such parent or other person.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(k). The definition also applies to persons who are pregnant or "in the process of
securing legal custody of any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years." Id. § 3604(k).
The Act places a single individual within the definition of "family." Id. § 3602(c) (1994). The
Act, however, does not protect that individual from discrimination unless she falls within the
definition of "familial status." Id. § 3604(k). Marital status is not a basis for protection unless the
couple has standing as members of another protected class. See id. §§ 3604-06 (1994); James A.
Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1106-07 (1989).
207. The Act defines "handicap" as
(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of the
person's major life activities, (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being
regarded as having such an impairment, but such term does not include current, illegal
use of or addiction to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).
42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). Congress suggests a broad definition of "handicap," as the Act protects not
only actual physical and mental disabilities but also protects persons who may be perceived by
others as having such disabilities. Although the definition specifically leaves out "current" use of
illegal controlled substances, courts have held that patients in drug rehabilitation programs fall
within the statute. See United States v. Southern Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 919 (4th Cir. 1992);
Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 459 (D.N.J. 1992).
Other examples of persons having "handicaps" within the meaning of the FHA include
persons infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). See Support Ministries for Per-
sons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Baxer v.
City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 730 (S.D. II1. 1989). Persons suffering from multiple sclero-
sis are also "handicapped" under the FHA. See Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 844 F. Supp.
116, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Last, elderly persons under daily care are included under the FHA. "K"
Care, Inc. v. Town of Lac du Flambeau, 510 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). See general-
ly William D. McElyea, The Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988: Potential Impact on Zoning
Practices Regarding Group Homes for the Handicapped, ZONING AND PLAN. L. REP., Sept. 1989,
at 148 (stating that "[t]he definition of 'handicap' in the Fair Housing Act Amendments ... is
broad, and designed to protect a wide range of people from housing discrimination").
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2. Discrimination Under the FHA
The Act prohibits several types of discriminatory conduct. °" Owners or
brokers may not refuse to sell or rent property, or negotiate for sale or rental,
on a discriminatory basis.2" Owners and brokers may not discriminate in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of a real estate transaction,2 misrepresent
housing availability, " ' or discriminate in advertising the sale or rental of
property. In addition, brokers may not engage in "blockbusting. '
The Act may also impose liability on municipal defendants.2 4 Plaintiffs
have successfully challenged discriminatory municipal zoning laws and official
policies under the FHA.2 5
3. Exemptions
Although the FHA sweeps broadly, prohibiting a wide variety of discrimi-
natory practices in the sale and rental of housing, the Act provides for several
exemptions. Two exemptions are relevant to this Survey.2 6 First, government
entities may pass restrictions reasonably limiting the number of occupants in
dwellings." 7 Second, provisions prohibiting discrimination based on familial
status do not apply to "housing for older persons."'211 Courts, however, inter-
pret these exemptions narrowly.1 9
208. For a more detailed discussion on what types of discriminatory practices are prohibited
by the Act, see Jennifer J. Ryan, A Real Estate Professional's and Attorney's Guide to the Fair
Housing Law's Recent Inclusion of Familial Status as a Protected Class, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1143, 1148-54 (1995).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)(f)(2). This type of conduct is commonly known as "steering." See
Ryan, supra note 208, at 1148.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); see Ryan, supra note 208, at 1149-50.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d); see Ryan, supra note 208, at 1150.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c); see Ryan, supra note 208, at 1150-53.
213. "Blockbusting" means inducing a landowner to sell or rent property by representing to
that landowner that renting or selling to a particular class of people will cause adverse effects,
such as reduced property values. See Ryan, supra note 208, at 1154; see also 42 U.S.C § 3604(c)
(discussing the prohibition of "[a]ttempt[ing] to induce any person to sell or rent a dwelling ...
[to] persons of a race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin).
214. A municipality is a "person" as defined in §§ 3602 and 3613 of the FHA and can thus
be liable under the Act. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1183-84 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
215. See, e.g., id. at 1186. In similarly postulated cases, plaintiffs have alleged a violation of
§ 3604(a), claiming that the city has denied them an opportunity to rent or buy housing, or have
alleged a violation of § 3617, claiming that the city interfered with their right to "equal housing
opportunity." See id. at 1181; Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights
(Arlington Heights II), 558 F.2d 1283, 1287 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
216. In addition to the exemptions discussed in this section, religious organizations and pri-
vate clubs who own dwellings may limit the sale, rental, or occupancy of those dwellings or give
preference to their members. Id. § 3607(a). Also, owners may refuse to sell or rent property to any
person who has previously been convicted of "the illegal manufacture or distribution of a con-
trolled substance as defined in § 802 of Title 21." 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(4) (1994).
217. Id. § 3607(b)(1).
218. Id.
219. See City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 804 (9th
Cir.) (holding "a broad remedial statute ... must be read narrowly"), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1176
(1995).
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4. Administrative Procedure
When seeking redress for injuries caused by discriminatory housing prac-
tices, "aggrieved person[s]" may file an administrative claim or bring a civil
cause of action under the FHA."' Because the Act provides for both admin-
istratijve and judicial remedies, a plaintiff may pursue either course without
exhausting administrative remedies.22' However, when a claimant chooses to
file an administrative claim with the Secretary of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), specific procedures of the FHA apply.2
The individual claimant may also seek an adjudicatory administrative hearing
under § 3612.223
5. Theories of Discrimination Under the FHA
Courts have recognized two theories of discrimination under the FHA:
disparate treatment discrimination and disparate impact discrimination. 24 The
cases surveyed in this article address both theories.
a. Disparate Treatment Discrimination
The most obvious type of housing discrimination arises where a defendant
intentionally discriminates against a plaintiff with protected status. 2 ' To in-
tentionally discriminate, the defendant's policy must, on its face, treat the
harmed party differently from other persons. A tenancy policy in which
220. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (1994). An '"aggrieved person' includes any person who-
(1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such
person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur." 42 U.S.C. §
3602(i). Thus, even individuals who are not a members of one of the classes against which the
Act expressly prohibits discrimination may still find protection as "aggrieved person(s]." See HUD
v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 874 (11 th Cir. 1990) (finding violation of FHA where white lessors
preferred to sell a house to a white family over an African-American family). Of course, the plain-
tiff must also meet constitutional standing requirements to maintain an action under the FHA. See
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982).
221. See Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1260 (E.D. Va.
1993). However, plaintiffs who have already entered into a conciliation agreement concerning the
allegedly discriminatory conduct or initiated proceedings at the administrative level may not seek
relief in federal court before exhausting the administrative process. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613(2)-(3)
(1994).
222. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(a)-(g) (1994) (establishing, in part, period of limitations, notice
requirements, and proper conciliation procedures).
223. Id. § 3612(a). The Act affords the parties the opportunity to "be represented by counsel,
present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and obtain the issuance of subpoenas." Id. § 3612(c).
The hearing takes place before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), "no later than 120 days fol-
lowing the issuance of the charge, unless it is impracticable to do so." Id. § 3612(g)(1). Within 60
days after this hearing, the Act directs the AJ to make "findings of fact and conclusions of law"
and issue the appropriate civil penalty or dismiss the case. Id. § 3612(g)(2)-(7). The Secretary has
the power to review these findings and conclusions for up to 30 days after the ALT issues them.
Id. § 3612(h)(1). If the Secretary does not review the order within 30 days, the order becomes
final. Id. At this point, "[any party aggrieved by a final order for relief... granting or denying in
whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order." Id. § 3612(i)(1).
224. Different sources have referred to the concept of disparate impact as discriminatory im-
pact, discriminatory effect, and disproportionate impact. For a discussion of the various names for
the doctrine, see Comment, Justifying a Discriminatory Effect Under the Fair Housing Act: A
Search for the Proper Standard, 27 UCLA L. REv. 398 n.8 (1979) [hereinafter Comment].
225. See supra text accompanying notes 202-05.
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prospective tenants must be white to qualify, for example, clearly falls within
this category. This type of discrimination is known as "disparate treatment"
discrimination because it involves "differential treatment of similarly situated
persons. 22 6 A plaintiff may recover under the FHA by demonstrating that
the defendant intended to discriminate and that the defendant committed one
of the discriminatory actions prohibited by the FHA.227
Plaintiffs may prove discriminatory intent in several different ways. Pro-
viding actual evidence of intent to discriminate is the surest way to meet the
standard. The Act does not require malevolent or unlawful intent, but simply
intent to treat a protected class differently than other persons.2 8 Courts may
also infer intent by examining circumstantial factors, such as discriminatory
effect on the injured party.22 9 Once a plaintiff presents sufficient evidence of
discriminatory intent, defendants may avoid liability if they can justify their
actions based on a "legitimate nondiscriminatory business purpose."23 ° The
FHA does not require, however, that a plaintiff show discriminatory intent as
the sole motivating factor for the challenged practice or conduct. Under the
Act, a plaintiff must merely prove that discriminatory intent was a "significant
factor" in the decision to initiate the discriminatory conduct.
23
Proving intent in FHA discrimination cases is often difficult.232 More-
over, actions not motivated by a discriminatory purpose often cause minorities
as much or more harm than blatantly discriminatory actions.233 For these rea-
sons, courts have allowed plaintiffs to prove FHA discrimination by showing a
discriminatory effect on a protected group. 34
226. NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933 (2d Cir. 1988), affd in part, 488
U.S. 15 (1988).
227. Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The ultimate question in a dispa-
rate treatment case is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against [the] plaintiff.").
228. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (discussing discriminatory
intent in the employment context); United States v. Reece, 457 F. Supp. 43, 48 (D. Mont. 1978)
(explaining how complainants can prove discriminatory intent in the context of renting apart-
ments).
229. Two circuits have addressed claims involving private defendants and facially neutral
policies where other evidence indicated discriminatory motives. United States v. Mitchell, 580
F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying disparate impact as a way to prove unlawful steering
where evidence suggested an apartment owner confined blacks to a specific area of the complex);
Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 828 (8th Cir.) (considering fact that developer's policy
to sell lots only to approved builders who would not build for blacks was "fraught with racial
overtones" in finding disparate impact discrimination), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974). But see
Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1534 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that with private
defendants, evidence of discriminatory impact is merely evidence of intent).
230. Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 989 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-44 (1989) (recognizing "significant factor" doctrine in em-
ployment context).
231. Burris v. Wilkins, 544 F.2d 891, 891 (5th Cir. 1977).
232. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 (recognizing "clever men may easily conceal their motiva-
tions").
233. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (noting that "some em-
ployment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be
functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination").
234. See, e.g., Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184-85 (discussing how a protected group can prove
discriminatory effect to demonstrate FHA discrimination).
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b. Disparate Impact Discrimination
The concept of disparate impact or disparate effect as proof of discrimina-
tion finds its roots in the context of employment discrimination under Title
VII as discussed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.2 35 In Griggs, the employer
required applicants to have a high school education and pass standardized tests
in order to qualify for employment. 36 This policy resulted in whites obtain-
ing nearly all jobs in the most desirable departments.2 37 Finding that the pur-
pose of Title VII was to eliminate discriminatory preference for any group
over another,238 the Supreme Court held the Act not only proscribed overt
discrimination but also practices "fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion." '239 Mindful of the defendant's interest in qualified employees, the Court
required that defendant show a "business necessity" to justify the policy.2"
The Court held the policy violated the Act because the defendant had not
sufficiently demonstrated that its hiring policy reasonably measured an
applicant's ability to perform on the job.24
The Court's analysis in Griggs set forth the disparate impact doctrine that
later emerged in FHA law. In applying Griggs to Title VIII housing discrimi-
nation cases,242 the appellate courts have found many similarities between
Title VIII and Title VII, including legislative history,243 purpose, and struc-
ture. 24 Based on these similarities, courts have concluded that the employ-
ment law approach should apply in the housing context.
2 4
The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case in a disparate impact
discrimination claim under the FHA." Courts will then either shift the
235. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
236. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
237. Id.




242. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934; Betsey, 736 F.2d at 987; Halet v. Wend Inv. Co.,
672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982); Mitchell, 580 F.2d at 791; Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147-48;
Arlington Heights l, 558 F.2d at 1288-89; Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184-85.
243. Legislative history suggests that Congress did not intend to require proof of discriminato-
ry intent to sustain a violation of the FHA. During floor debate on the FHA, Senator Mondale
remarked that the best way to ensure fair housing is to eliminate segregation. 114 CONG. REC.
3422 (1968). One commentator reasoned that unless the courts interpret the statute to prohibit all
de facto discrimination, they could not ensure an end to segregation. Comment, supra note 224, at
406. Thus, a discriminatory effect approach is necessary to honor legislative intent. The Seventh
Circuit accepted this reasoning in Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934. Furthermore, the Senate
rejected an amendment that would have made proof of intent a necessary element in any case of
discrimination under the FHA. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147; cf Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 935
(narrowing Rizzo by pointing out that the proposed amendment would only have applied to single-
family owner-occupied houses).
244. Courts have noted many similarities between Title VIII and Title VII. Town of Hunting-
ton, 844 F.2d at 935. Congress enacted both statutes as part of a scheme of civil rights legislation
intended to end racial discrimination. Id. The two statutes also have similar proof requirements. Id.
245. Courts have also pointed to practical concerns, such as the difficulty in proving motiva-
tion for a discriminatory practice, as a final reason why the disparate impact analysis from Title
VII should apply under the FHA. Id.; Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185.
246. E.g., Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826-27 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting that "the
concept of 'prima facie case' applies to discrimination in housing").
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burden to the defendant to show some level of nondiscriminatory justification,
like a "business necessity,"" or they will apply a balancing test" to
determine whether the defendant is liable under the FHA.
The Eighth Circuit announced the basic elements of a prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination in United States v. City of Black Jack.249 To
show disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a spe-
cific policy of the defendant actually results or predictably will result in racial
discrimination.25 The Black Jack court determined that plaintiffs established
a prima facie case where a zoning ordinance banned multiple family dwellings
in an area with a 99% white population."'
Plaintiffs often use statistical evidence to show discriminatory effect. The
circuit courts do not agree, however, on what statistics sufficiently demonstrate
a prima facie case of discriminatory impact. There are at least two ways to
show discriminatory effect.252 The first way to show a measurable adverse
impact on a specific racial group.253 The second is to show that the action
resulted in harm to the community by perpetuating segregation. 54
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of housing discrimination
under the Act, some courts apply a balancing test to determine whether to
impose liability for the practice having a discriminatory effect.255 The Sev-
enth Circuit, in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II),256 adopted the first of these tests.
The Arlington Heights II four-part test examines: (1) the strength of the
plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) the evidence of some discrimi-
natory intent on the part of the defendant; 257 (3) the defendant's interest in
247. See, e.g., Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988-89.
248. See, e.g., Arlington Heights 11, 558 F.2d at 1291-92 (applying a four-part test).
249. 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
250. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184.
251. Id. at 1186. Although the city passed the ordinance before the construction of such
dwellings, the court found "ample proof' that blacks would have lived in the planned development
of townhouses had the plaintiffs been allowed to construct them. Id. Thus, discrimination was
predictable because the zoning ordinance perpetuated segregation and limited the opportunities of
blacks to live in Black Jack. Id.
252. Arlington Heights H, 558 F.2d at 1290 (citing effects on a racial group and effect on a
community).
253. See, e.g., Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 143 (finding prima facie case of discrimination where mi-
norities constituted 95% of the waiting list for public housing).
254. See Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 937 (finding prima facie case of discrimination
because, although proposed housing project intended a minority population of 25%, allowing it to
be built would serve to begin desegregating a community which was currently 98% white). In
Black Jack, instead of looking at the statistical data to see what percentage of blacks compared to
whites living in the metropolitan area would be barred from living in the area to which the zoning
ordinance applied (which was 32% of blacks compared with 29% of whites), the court focused on
years of "deliberate racial discrimination" which effectively barred 85% of blacks living in the
metropolitan area from being able to live in Black Jack. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186.
255. See, e.g., Arlington Heights I, 558 F.2d at 1290 (applying a four-part test).
256. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
257. Even when adopting the test, the Seventh Circuit admitted that the second element, evi-
dence of discriminatory intent, merits the least weight in the test. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at
1292. Subsequent decisions adopting the other elements of the test have left out the second ele-
ment completely. Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986). The Seventh Cir-
cuit has noted that when evidence of intent presents itself, such evidence inevitably weighs in
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taking the action complained of; and (4) whether the plaintiff seeks "to compel
the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for members of minority groups
or merely restrain the defendant from interfering with individual property
owners who wish to provide such housing."" The Fourth and Sixth circuits
have adopted similar tests in cases involving municipalities." 9
Although the requirements for a prima facie case also apply to the first
element of the Arlington Heights 11 test, courts do not use the test as an alter-
native to the prima facie case requirement from Black Jack.2" Instead, courts
weigh the evidence the plaintiff presents when establishing a prima facie case
as part of the determination on the merits. 6' In jurisdictions applying this
test, the minimum evidence needed to prevail on the merits provides the
threshold for a prima facie case.
Courts that apply some version of the Arlington Heights II balancing test
consider the defendant's justification in evaluating her interest. 62 Other
courts shift the burden to the defendant to show some business necessity or
other justification when the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimi-
natory impact. 63 The Black Jack court required a "compelling government
interest" to overcome a prima facie case. Subsequent decisions by the courts
reserve such an onerous burden for equal protection analysis and apply a less
stringent standard.t" The Third Circuit, in Resident Advisory Board v.
Rizzo,265 first articulated the majority view which later courts have used to
evaluate cases involving municipal defendants.2" This approach analyzes
favor of the plaintiff when viewing the other considerations. Arlington Heights 11, 558 F.2d at
1292; see also Matthews Co., 499 F.2d at 828 (considering "racial overtones" in rejecting
defendant's business justification for a practice which was racially discriminatory in effect).
258. Arlington Heights 11, 558 F.2d at 1290.
259. See Arthur, 782 F.2d at 575 (refusing to adopt the second element); Smith v. Town of
Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982). The Second Circuit, although applying the Eighth
Circuit's burden-shifting test to a municipal defendant, considered the third and fourth factors of
the Arlington Heights I1 test. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 936. The Fourth Circuit has ex-
pressly refused to apply the test to cases involving private defendants. Betsey, 738 F.2d at 989 n.5.
260. See Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 935-36; Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148 n.32. The Second
Circuit said that the test is to be considered in a "final determination on the merits," not when
considering the plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d
at 935.
261. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 935-36.
262. See Arthur, 782 F.2d at 577; Smith, 682 F.2d at 1065.
263. E.g., Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 940 (considering the fourth Arlington Heights 11
factor in a burden-shifting analysis); Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988-89. The Eighth circuit has consistent-
ly applied the burden-shifting approach to cases involving both private and public defendants. See
Matthews Co., 499 F.2d at 828-29 (involving a private defendant).
264. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148.
265. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
266. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148-49; see Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 939. In Griggs and
other employment cases, courts have considered whether the test having a discriminatory effect
was "substantially related to job performance." Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148. The Rizzo court could not
identify a single objective in the housing context by which to analyze all of a defendant's poten-
tial legitimate justifications. Id. at 149; see also Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 936 (noting that
"in Title Vm cases there is no single objective like job performance to which the legitimacy of
the facially neutral rule may be related"). The provider of housing is principally interested only in
the tenant's ability to pay, maintaining the value of her property, and maintaining the health and
safety of her tenants. The court in Rizzo noted that "the consequences of an error in admitting a
tenant do not seem nearly as severe as, for example, the consequences of an error in hiring an
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defendant justifications on a case-by-case basis26 under two guidelines. First,
the housing practice complained of must serve a "legitimate, bona fide interest
of the Title VIII defendant."" Second, the defendant must show that no al-
ternate, less discriminatory action was available to serve the defendant's inter-
est.2"
Only the Fourth Circuit has distinguished between private and public
defendants in evaluating the defendant's justification.27 In a case involving a
private defendant, the Fourth Circuit held that to rebut a prima facie case, the
defendant must show a "business necessity sufficiently compelling to justify
the challenged practice."27'
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Smith v. Town of Clarkton272 emphasiz-
es the importance of the final element of the Arlington Heights II test. The
Smith court held that by withdrawing from a joint low income housing authori-
ty, and thereby blocking the construction of a proposed low-income housing
project to be financed by HUD, the municipal defendant discriminated against
the plaintiff because of his race.273 At the same time, however, the court re-
versed that part of the lower court ruling requiring the city to build low-in-
come housing from its own local treasury.274
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Bangerter v. Orem City Corp.
275
a. Facts
In Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., the Tenth Circuit addressed a claim of
housing discrimination based on both disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact. 276 A Utah state hospital discharged the mentally handicapped plaintiff
and placed him in a group home with two other mentally handicapped
men.277 The group home was located in a zoning district designated as "sin-
gle family" with a number of exceptions that allowed for group homes.278
unqualified airline pilot." Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148-49.
267. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See Betsey, 736 F.2d at 985 (considering claim that an adults-only policy had a racially
discriminatory effect). For a related view, compare Smith, 682 F.2d at 1058-59, considering claim
against municipal defendant, Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 150, and Matthews Co., 499 F.2d at 828-29, re-
quiring less restrictive alternative analysis to justify a private developer's policy of selling to only
approved builders.
271. Betsey, 738 F.2d at 988.
272. 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982).
273. Smith, 682 F.2d at 1055.
274. Id. at 1069. The court held that requiring a municipality to build the housing project
would "be an unwarranted intrusion into Clarkton's local governmental function, disproportionate
to the wrong committed." Id. at 1069-70. Subsequently, in Betsey, the Fourth Circuit interpreted
the element to apply only to government defendants. Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988 n.5.
275. 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995).
276. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1494.
277. Id.
278. Id. The exceptions included "nurses' homes, foster family care homes, convents, monas-
teries, rectories.., and group homes for the elderly." Id.
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The city allowed group homes for the mentally and physically handicapped in
this zoning district only on the condition that they obtain a conditional use
permit. 79 State statutory conditions.. also required the facility operator to
assure proper 24-hour supervision and the establishment of a community advi-
sory committee that allowed neighbors to address concerns. 8'
The home's operator, RLO, Inc., had not obtained a conditional use per-
mit when the plaintiff moved in but later applied for the permit at the city's
12insistence. The city granted the permit subject to the two restrictions noted
above.8 3 After the plaintiff was transferred out of the city, he filed an action
against Orem City alleging (1) that the FHA preempted the conditions the
Utah statute imposed and such conditions violated the FHAA, and (2) that the
application process violated the FHAA by requiring the plaintiff to subject
himself to threats and disparaging remarks in public hearings. 84
In granting defendant's motion to dismiss on both claims, the district
court characterized the claim as one of discriminatory effect.8 5 The district
court found that Bangerter had established a prima facie case by showing that
the statute treated handicapped persons differently from non-handicapped.
28 6
The district court ruled, however, that the requirements "rationally related to
the [city's] legitimate government interest of integrating the handicapped 'into
normal surroundings,"' and dismissed the complaint.
27
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court mischaracterized
the nature of the discrimination claim, applied the incorrect standard of re-
view, and improperly granted the motion to dismiss.288 Reviewing relevant
employment cases on the issue, the court first noted that "discriminatory treat-
ment" does not require malevolent intent,289 but rather a showing of "explic-
itly differential" treatment of a protected group."9 In light of this distinction,
the Tenth Circuit held that when a plaintiff challenges "facially discriminatory
actions," rather than "the effects of facially neutral actions," the court should
decide plaintiff's claim under a disparate treatment analysis and not a disparate
279. Id. According to the record before the Tenth Circuit, the conditional use permit require-
ment only applied to group homes for handicapped and not to any of the other types of group
homes listed. Id. at 1495 n.l.
280. Id. at 1495 n.2; see UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-2.5 (1992).
281. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1495 n.2.
282. Id. at 1495-96.
283. Id. at 1496 & n.6. A third restriction required psychiatric certification to ensure residents
were not violent. Id.
284. Id. at 1496.
285. Id. at 1497 n.9.
286. Id. at 1496.
287. Id. at 1497.
288. Id. at 1500.




impact analysis.29' The court concluded that the district court improperly
characterized Bangerter's claim as one of disparate impact. 92
Thus, the Tenth Circuit analyzed Bangerter's claims under a disparate
treatment analysis. First, Bangerter made out a prima facie case of disparate
treatment when he alleged that Orem imposed restrictions on group homes for
handicapped that it did not impose on other group homes.2 93 Next, the Tenth
Circuit held that the district court erred in applying a "rational relationship"
standard of review in analyzing the defendant's justifications for the discrimi-
natory policy.2 94 Instead, the Tenth Circuit looked to the FHAA itself, the
statute's legislative intent, and interpretive decisions to determine what justifi-
cations, if any, Congress thought adequate to support a facially discriminatory
law or policy.295
The Tenth Circuit identified two justifications for the discriminatory re-
strictions. First, § 3604(f)(9) of the FHAA permits "reasonable restrictions on
the terms or conditions of housing when justified by public safety con-
cers."'2 96 The court cautioned that such restrictions "must be tailored to par-
ticularized concerns about individual residents," not to "blanket stereotypes
about the handicapped."297 The restrictions must also bear a "necessary cor-
relation to the actual abilities of the persons upon whom it is imposed."29
Second, a defendant may impose special zoning restrictions applicable only to
handicapped persons where the restrictions benefit the handicapped.299 The
benefit such restrictions provide to the handicapped persons, however, must
"clearly outweigh" the burden they impose.30 Furthermore, like safety mea-
sures, restrictions intended to benefit the handicapped must be "narrowly tai-
lored" to the special needs of the particular individuals affected by them.3'
Thus, Bangerter distinguished between disparate impact and disparate
treatment and held that courts should look to the expressed and implied FHA
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1502; see Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that "the
ultimate question in a disparate treatment case is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated
against plaintiff").
294. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503. The "rational relationship" test, applicable to equal protec-
tion claims not involving a suspect class was inappropriate since the plaintiff's complaint sought
relief under the FHA, not the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(9) (permitting denial of housing based on a "direct threat to
the health or safety"). The court reasoned that if a defendant may deny housing altogether for this
purpose, then certainly it may impose reasonable restrictions. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503.
297. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503; see H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2179.
298. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1504 (quoting Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery Coun-
ty, 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1300 (D. Md. 1993)). On remand, the court directed the district court to
consider the extent of the residents' mental disabilities, the scope of the restrictions, and whether
the restrictions reasonably addressed safety concerns arising from the residents' handicaps. Id.
299. Id. The court stated that "the FHAA should not be interpreted to preclude special resiric-
tions upon the disabled that are really beneficial to, rather than discriminatory against, the
handicapped." Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. The defendant must also show that there is no less restrictive alternative that would
serve the same purpose. Id. at 1505.
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exemptions when analyzing a defendant's justification for a facially discrimi-
natory policy. The next case discusses the standard when dealing with justifi-
cations for facially neutral policies having a discriminatory effect.
2. Mountain Side Mobile Estates Partnership v. Secretary of HUD'
a. Facts
In Mountain Side, the Tenth Circuit adopted disparate impact as the test
for proving discrimination under the FHA 33 The defendants in Mountain
Side owned and operated a trailer park.3" The park, built in the 1960s, had a
density greatly exceeding modem parks." 5 The defendants leased the lots
individually "for placement of one mobile home," and provided "water, power,
telephone, and sewer hookups to each lot."3' 6 Until 1989, the defendants
maintained an adults only policy.30 7 When the FHAA became effective in
1989, the defendants decided to eliminate the adults only policy rather than
modify the policy to fall within the "housing for older persons" exemp-
tion."° The defendants hired a contractor to conduct a study on the effect of
an increase of population on the quality of life in the park.3" As a result of
this study, the defendants decided to adopt a limited occupancy policy allow-
ing no more than three occupants per trailer.1
Jacqueline VanLoozenoord, her three minor children, and Michael Brace,
her "roommate and companion," moved into the park in 1991.2 " The plain-
tiffs purchased their mobile home from a third party who did not advise them
of the occupancy limit."2 The plaintiffs also did not apply for tenancy with
park management.313 The resident manager discovered that five people occu-
pied the trailer and confronted Brace.3 4 Management then initiated eviction
proceedings against the plaintiffs, and prevailed solely on the grounds that the
tenants had failed to apply for residency.3"5  Plaintiffs Brace and
VanLoozenoord filed separate complaints with HUD, asserting that Mountain
Side had discriminated on the basis of "familial status" in violation of the
F HA.
316
HUD issued charges against Mountain Side for discriminating against the
plaintiffs on the basis of their familial status.317 After a full evidentiary
302. 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995).
303. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1250.






310. Id. at 1255-56.




315. Id. at 1246-47.
316. Id. at 1247.
317. Id. Attempts at conciliation failed when the tenants refused to attend. Id. Thereafter,
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hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (AU) dismissed the discrimination
charges.3 The Secretary of HUD remanded the case twice to the ALJ to
reconsider the dismissal.3"9 Both times the AUJ rejected HUD's claims.32 °
Finally, the Secretary reversed the decision and entered a judgment for
HUD.3"' The AU then granted damages and injunctive relief to the com-
plainants after making several factual findings.322
b. Decision323
Before reversing the final order, the Tenth Circuit initially reaffirmed
Bangerter's dictum that a claimant may prove FIA discrimination by dispa-
rate impact.324 Finding the occupancy limit facially neutral, the court charac-
terized the case as one of disparate impact.325
The court did not fully address whether the plaintiffs had established a
prima facie case by showing national statistical evidence that the three-person
occupancy policy disproportionately excluded families with children.2 6 In-
stead, the majority assumed without deciding that the plaintiffs had met their
burden of establishing a prima facie case, as recognized in Black Jack.32'
The majority adopted a modified form of the Arlington Heights 11 test,
adopting three of the four factors, but refusing to adopt the element which
looks to evidence of discriminatory intent.32 The court added, "we are





322. Id. The majority opinion lists these findings of fact in detail. Id. at 1255-56. First, after
the FHAA took effect in 1989, Mountain Side considered modifying the policy to allow families a
more "viable opportunity." Id. at 1255. Second, in 1988, Mountain Side conducted its own survey
in which it considered "the condition and age of the utilities, the density of homes, and the overall
size of the Park," and determined that the park could not support a population beyond a three-
person per trailer maximum. Id. Nor did it consider feasible any alternatives to the occupancy
limit. Id. In 1991, on the advice of counsel, the park hired an expert contractor to perform a simi-
lar study to evaluate the "legitimacy" of the three-person occupancy policy. Id. After evaluating
only resident health and safety based on infrastructure limitations and resident comfort based on
size and density, the expert recommended a two person per bedroom limit in addition to a maxi-
mum population limit of 916. Id. at 1256. Third, the park had historically experienced low water
pressure and sewage problems. Id. Fourth, the park was almost twice as dense as new parks. Id.
323. The case came to the Tenth Circuit on direct appeal from the ALJ's final order. Id. at
1246.
324. Id. at 1250.
325. Id. at 1252.
326. Id. at 1253 (expressing doubt that national, rather than local, statistics were appropriate
to prove a discriminatory effect in this case).
327. Id. at 1251-52; see supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
328. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1252. The court stated:
The three factors we will consider in determining whether a plaintiff's prima facie case
of disparate impact makes out a violation of Title VIII are: (1) the strength of the
plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) the defendant's interest in taking the ac-
tion complained of; and (3) whether the plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant affirma-
tively to provide housing for members of a protected class or merely to restrain the
defendant from interfering with individual property owners who wish to provide such
housing.
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mindful of the Seventh Circuit's admonition that 'we must decide close cases
in favor of integrated housing."'329 In discussing the first element of the test,
the court gave little weight to the national statistical evidence the claimants
had presented and on which the Secretary had relied.33
As to the second prong, the defendant's interest in the complained-of
action,... the Secretary had required that defendants show "'compelling need
or necessity' to justify the occupancy policy.332 The majority disagreed,333
looking instead to Griggs and the "business necessity" defense for the proper
standard. 34 Adapting this standard to the housing context, the court held that
the defendant must show a "manifest relationship" between the discriminatory
practice and the housing in question.333 Applying the "manifest relationship"
test, the court held that the two reasons given by the defendant for the occu-
pancy limit: "sewer capacity" and "concern over the quality of park life," had
a manifest relationship to the housing in the trailer park.336
Although the majority expressly adopted the fourth prong of the Arlington
Heights II test in its holding (as the third prong in the Tenth Circuit test), the
court did not discuss that prong of the test in its analysis of the facts.33
329. Id. (quoting Arlington Heights 1I, 558 F.2d at 1294).
330. Id. at 1253. Remember that the majority had already assumed that this statistical evi-
dence could establish a prima facie case of housing discrimination. See supra text accompanying
note 330. According to the majority, the Secretary, in making his decision to remand, had relied
on national statistics indicating:
At least 71.2% of all U.S. households with four or more persons contain one or more
children under the age of 18 years; ... at least 50.5% of U.S. families with minor chil-
dren have four or more individuals; and ... at least 11.7% of households without minor
children have four or more persons.
Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1253. The majority did not agree with the claimants that national statis-
tics of family composition accurately reflected the composition of the local housing market. Id.
331. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1253.
332. Id. at 1254.
333. "[Tlhere is no requirement that the defendant establish a 'compelling need or necessity'
for the challenged practice to pass muster since this degree of scrutiny would be almost impossi-
ble to satisfy." Id. at 1254-55.
334. Id. at 1254. In the Title VII context, the employer has a burden of showing a "manifest
relationship to the employment in question." Id. (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432). The court
stated, "[O]nce plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the
defendant to produce evidence of a 'genuine business need' for the challenged practice." Id. "The
touchstone is business necessity." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
335. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1254 (emphasis added). To clarify the threshold of this stan-
dard, the court stated that "a mere insubstantial justification in this regard will not suffice, because
such a low standard would permit discrimination to be practiced through the use of spurious,
seemingly neutral practices." Id.
336. Id. at 1255-57. To reach that conclusion, the majority applied the facts of the case from
the record established by the ALU on the third remand. Id. Although the analysis is cursory at best,
the crucial facts the majority relied upon seem to include the park's historical sewage problems
and the conclusions in both studies that an occupancy limit was necessary in light of the structural
limitations of the park. Id.; see supra note 322.
337. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1253. The court simply noted that when a plaintiff seeks to
require a defendant to "take affirmative action to correct a Title VIII violation, plaintiff must make




In his dissenting opinion, Judge Henry made three arguments in response
to the majority. First, he believed that the national statistics on which the
Secretary had relied sufficed to meet the standard for a prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination.3" Second, Judge Henry feared that the engi-
neering study the defendants presented to justify their policy was a "post-hoc"
rationalization for an otherwise discriminatory policy because the study had
actually suggested an alternative policy.339 Finally, Judge Henry disagreed
with the majority for making the trade-off between the "quality of life" and
providing equal access to housing for families with children.3" In his view,
Congress, in passing the FHAA, "chose to protect children and resolved this
question in favor of nondiscrimination. '
C. Analysis
While the two cases reflect consistency within the Tenth Circuit, the hold-
ings diverged from the trend in other circuits regarding housing discrimination
issues. In Bangerter, the Tenth Circuit recognized that a plaintiff may prove
discrimination by disparate impact, but then held that where a policy was
facially discriminatory, a plaintiff may only recover on a disparate treatment
theory. Mountain Side's refusal to adopt the intent element of the Seventh
Circuit's test for disparate impact thus seems consistent with the court in
Bangerter.
The majority's approach in Mountain Side, however, imposes an eviden-
tiary problem for claimants. Because the test does not consider proof of dis-
criminatory intent, the court must accept as true any business justification the
defendant proffers, as long as that justification flows logically from the facts.
In contrast, a consideration of discriminatory motives would aid in a disparate
impact analysis by giving the plaintiff an avenue to refute "post hoc" rational-
izations. Because the disparate treatment analysis adopted in Bangerter asks
only whether the policy is facially discriminatory, it also does not examine
intent. As a result, "clever" defendants in the Tenth Circuit can "easily conceal
338. Id. at 1257 (Henry, J., dissenting); see Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146,
1148 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that when a plaintiff presents any statistical evidence tending to
show discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut that evidence); see also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (explaining that national height and weight statistics could
be used to meet a prima facie case of employment discrimination when "there was no reason to
suppose" that the national statistics would not reflect the characteristics of the local population).
339. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1257. The limited occupancy plan recommended by the ex-
pert, which would have limited "occupancy to two-people-per-bedroom in each unit," would have
allowed the plaintiffs to stay. Id. at 1258. At the time of the dispute, the actual occupancy limit
was less than half of the "maximum" suggested by the expert, and there was no evidence of an
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their motivations" and get away with it.342 Thus, the court should reassess its
refusal to consider a subjective element in its disparate impact analysis.
Another issue on which the Tenth Circuit diverged from other courts was
in the standard for evaluating defendants' justifications for discriminatory
policies. Mountain Side's "manifest relationship" test does not reflect recent
refinements of FHA disparate impact analysis which require, in part, that a
defendant's policy employ the least restrictive means of furthering its business
(or municipal) interest. As the dissent pointed out, the expert study suggested
the Mountain Side defendants could have met their business goals by limiting
occupancy to two persons per bedroom. Therefore, even though the plan they
did adopt had a "manifest relationship" to the needs of the trailer park, they
could have adopted a less restrictive policy to meet the same goals.
Finally, for the first time in any circuit, Mountain Side applied the
Arlington Heights II test to analyze claims against a private defendant.343 Re-
jecting the test in a similar context, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the final
element only makes sense when applied to public defendants. In contrast, the
Tenth Circuit modified this element, applying it in the private context.3" The
Tenth Circuit's analogy is problematic since in every disparate impact case
involving a private landlord or property owner, the defendant can characterize
the plaintiff's claim as seeking to require the defendant to modify a neutral
practice. Thus, either the last element will never apply to a private defendant
because it contemplates a municipality, or, in every such claim, the Tenth
Circuit will require "a greater showing of discriminatory effect."345
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit has taken a step forward by recognizing the right of a
plaintiff to prove housing discrimination by disparate impact. This advance,
however, is marred by the court's failure to consider many issues in formulat-
ing the test for analyzing such claims. Unfortunately, the court will be forced
to confront these matters again when its test fails to adequately address the
issues in a different factual scenario. As with the right to informational priva-
cy, the Tenth Circuit has set forth a disparate impact analysis that jealously
protects one interest to the exclusion of almost all competing interests.
Paul Karlsgodt
342. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 (recognizing that "clever men may easily conceal their
motivations").343. The majority did not address the Fourth Circuit's express refusal to apply a test in a case
involving a private defendant. See supra text accompanying notes 270-71.
344. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1253. The court of appeals framed this element: "'where
plaintiff seeks a judgment which would require defendant to take affirmative action to correct a
Title VIII violation [rather than enjoin the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's rights],
plaintiff must make a greater showing of discriminatory effect."' Id. (quoting Casa Marie, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 988 F.2d 252, 269 n.20 (lst Cir. 1993)).
345. Id. The fact that the majority did not analyze this element does not more strongly sup-
port one conclusion over the other.
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